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WHY REMOVING 101 WON’T BE ENOUGH AND WHAT TO DO
INSTEAD
Daniel Cole *
Congress recently released a reform proposal for Section 101
of the U.S. Patent Act. The draft included the following language:
“No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject
matter eligibility including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of nature, or
‘natural phenomena,’ shall be used to determine patent eligibility
under Section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting those
exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.” 1 This is a blatant
attempt to overturn Alice Corp v. CLS Bank International, 2 Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 3 and
related cases which created the judicial exceptions that prevent the
patenting of “abstract ideas,” “laws of nature,” and “natural
phenomena.” However, simply abrogating the cases with language
like the above will not be enough to survive the Supreme Court.
Without significant alterations to the proposed text, the effort to
abrogate the judicial exceptions is doomed to failure. Section I of
this article briefly explores the reasons Mayo and Alice need to be
abrogated. Section II investigates the legal and philosophical
After receiving a Master’s degree in biochemistry from Wake Forest and
teaching chemistry at community colleges across North Carolina, Daniel
received a law degree from the University of North Carolina. Currently, he helps
established and startup companies with patent and trademark issues at the Olive
Law Group. He has a special interest in patentability issues as well as
international and famous trademark issues. When not thinking about technology
or law, he enjoys playing with his cat as well as reading and watching sci-fi.
This paper is dedicated to Ron and Benita Cole as well as Samarah Shakir.
Thank you for always believing in me and making me believe in myself.
1
See Eileen McDermott, Draft Text of Proposed New Section 101 Reflects
(May
22,
2019),
Patent
Owner
Input,
IPWATCHDOG
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/22/draft-text-proposed-new-section-101reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498/ [https://perma.cc/N2S4-86TN].
2
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 208 (2014).
3
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 67
(2012).
*
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underpinnings of Mayo and Alice. Section III discusses how Mayo
and Alice’s legal underpinnings doom the current legislative
proposal. Contrary to the opinions of some, 4 these cases do have a
constitutional basis and interested parties ignore that basis at their
peril. Section IV provides alternative ways forward.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................142
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A. Precedent for Incorporating Novelty and Obviousness
into 101 Evaluations .....................................................147
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2. Products, Laws of Nature .......................................160
C. The Philosophical Underpinnings of the 101 Exceptions164
III. WHY THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FIX IS DOOMED .........166
A. How to Overcome the 101 Exceptions ..........................171
IV. CONCLUSION ......................................................................176
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II.

I.
INTRODUCTION
One half of the 2015 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine
was awarded to Tu Youyou for the discovery of Artemisinin. 5
According to the Nobel Prize Committee, this discovery will have
See Gene Quinn, Sherry Knowles Scrutinizes an Activist Supreme Court and
its Unconstitutional Approach to Patent Eligibility, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 16,
2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/16/sherry-knowles-scrutinizesactivist-supreme-court-unconstitutional-patent-eligibility/id=105228/
[https://perma.cc/FD5G-L8YR]; Gene Quinn, Does the Supreme Court Even
Appreciate the Patent Eligibility Chaos They Created?, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 12,
2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/12/103256/id=103256/
[https://perma.cc/SC74-JAPS].
5
Press Release, Nobel Assembly at Karolinska Institutet, The Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine 2015 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/medicine/2015/press-release/
[https://perma.cc/MJ9W-TUH3]
[hereinafter Nobel Assembly].
4
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“consequences in terms of improved human health and reduced
suffering [that] are immeasurable.” 6 However, if Ms. Youyou
applied for a patent on Artemisinin in the United States, it would
be denied under Section 101 of the Patent Act as a product of
nature.
The Patent Act controls the operations of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) which grants inventors
patents on their inventions. 7 The Patent Act contains three main
Sections: 101, 102, and 103. 8 Section 103 governs determining if
the proposed invention is merely obvious over the prior art and
therefore not deserving of a patent. 9 Section 102 governs
determining if the proposed invention is novel over the prior art
and so deserving of a patent. 10 Section 101 governs eligible subject
matter and states that articles of manufacture, machines, processes,
compositions of matter, or improvements of the above are
patentable. 11
So-called judicial exceptions to 101 have arguably existed
since the 1800’s, 12 but the U.S. Supreme Court recently
rejuvenated them in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 13 Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 14 and
related cases. Alice, Mayo, and related cases held that abstract
ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are unpatentable. 15
As Artemisinin, is produced by the sweet wormwood plant, it
would be an unpatentable natural product. 16

6

Id.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148
(1989).
8
Id. at 148–50; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2018).
9
Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 150.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 148.
12
See infra Section II.
13
See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 208 (2014).
14
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 67
(2012).
15
See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 208; Mayo Collaborative, 566 U.S. at 67; see
also infra Section II.
16
See Nobel Assembly, supra note 5.
7
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In the past, inventors would claim a purified form of a natural
compound, and these patents held up in court. 17 Current law would
invalidate these patents. The Supreme Court has held broadly that
natural products are unpatentable. 18 Myriad Genetic’s argument
that isolating BRCA genes 19 from the human genome 20 made the
isolated genes patent eligible was rejected by the Supreme Court. 21
The Supreme Court made no mention of any of the lower court
cases upholding purified forms of a natural compound. However,
the Supreme Court would likely hold isolated Artemisinin is still
simply natural Artemisinin like the isolated BRCA gene was still
simply the natural BRCA gene. The USPTO in its eligibility
examples certainly takes this approach. 22 The only tenable
explanation is that, though worthy of a Nobel Prize, Artemisinin is
unpatentable.
Natural products, however, are “almost an inexhaustible array
of molecular entities” 23 and an “infinite resource for drug
development [.]” 24 The fact that around half of the drugs approved
during the last thirty years, several of them blockbuster drugs, are
derived from natural products makes their critical role in modern
17
See generally Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156
(4th Cir. 1958) (upholding a patent on a purified form of vitamin B12); ParkeDavis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (upholding
patented claims on purified adrenaline).
18
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589
(2013).
19
Particular mutations, changes in the DNA base structure, at particular points
in the genome lead to increased risk of cancer. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. at
582–83. Mutation in the BRCA gene is known to lead to an increased risk of
breast cancer. Id. at 583.
20
Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. at 593.
21
Id.
22
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
EXAMPLES:
LIFE
SCIENCES
4,
18–19
(May
4,
2016)
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-ex.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UUF3-H62N]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, NATUREBASED PRODUCTS 4, 6–8, 10, 12, 14–15 (Dec. 16, 2014),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/mdc_examples_naturebased_products.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9AN-TJR3].
23
Ciddi Veeresham, Natural Products Derived from Plants as a Source of
Drugs, 3 J. ADVANCED PHARM. TECH. & RES. 200, 200 (2012).
24
Id.
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drug discovery self-evident. 25 All of these drugs would now be
patent ineligible.
Currently, discovering and bringing a new drug to market costs
upwards of 2.8 billion dollars. 26 Why would any company spend
this incomprehensible amount of money if the well-funded and
established generic industry could market the invention as soon as
it is approved by the FDA without the associated exorbitant costs?
Unless the return on investment is economically justified, the
incentive is removed. As our current battery of antibiotics becomes
unusable, 27 do we really want to remove the business justification
for finding viable natural replacements? Expecting debt-strapped
governments to pick up the slack is naïve. The imbalance between
legal protections and business incentives is illustrated by the
decrease since 2009 in private venture capital and equity
investment
in
biotechnology
medical
devices
and
pharmaceuticals. 28
The change in incentives has also impacted the software
industry as shown by reduced investment in the software space. 29
Recognizing these facts David Kappos, the director of the USPTO
under President Obama from 2009 to 2013, has called for the
removal of Section 101. 30 Mr. Kappos reasoned that (1) current
25

Id.
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 27 (2016).
27
See Ryan W. Miller, Drug-Resistant Superbugs are Killing Thousands of
Americans. Here’s What You Need to Know About Them, USA TODAY (last
updated Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/
2019/11/15/antibiotic-resistant-superbugs-killing-thousands-whatknow/4189718002/ [https://perma.cc/4DRZ-DNR7].
28
David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming) (SMU Dedman Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.
414, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340937 [https://perma.cc/RPN7-E7FB];
Jason Rantanen, Guest Post on Patent Eligibility and Investment: A Survey,
PATENTLYO (Mar. 6, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/03/patenteligibility-investment.html [https://perma.cc/32JQ-3MJD].
29
Taylor, supra note 28.
30
Telephone Interview with David J. Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (2016) [hereinafter Kappos Interview]; see also Daniel Cole, Should
Section 101 of the Patent Act be Removed, IPWATCHDOG (June 23, 2016),
26
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eligibility law threatens protection of key American industries, 31
(2) Europe and Asia have no problems constraining patent eligible
subject matter without a section equivalent to 101, 32 and (3) the
policy issues dealt with by Section 101 can be better dealt with
through use of Sections 102 and 103. 33 Since America “is
providing less protection than other countries[,]” an inventor is
better off seeking patents in Europe or China. 34
Modern economies are based on innovation. If America is
going to continue its economic and global leadership, we need to
increase, not decrease, the rewards for innovation. Grueling hours
spent in the lab or the machine shop require incentive. 35 “[L]osing
the innovative edge and becoming economically dominated by
other countries is how modern countries die.” 36
In an attempt to address the above concerns Congress recently
released a draft proposal that would reform Section 101 of the
Patent Act. The draft included the following language: “No
implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject matter
eligibility, including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of nature,’ or ‘natural
phenomena’ shall be used to determine patent eligibility under
Section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting those
exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.” 37 The draft proposal
cited above is a blatant attempt to overturn the eligibility cases
discussed above. However, simply abrogating the cases with
language like the above will not be enough to eliminate the
exceptions. Without significant alterations to the proposed text, the
effort to make abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
phenomena patentable is doomed to failure.
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/23/section-101-patent-actremoved/id=70230/ [https://perma.cc/6D7T-8C64].
31
Kappos Interview, supra note 30.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Cole, supra note 30.
36
Id.
37
See Eileen McDermott, Draft Text of Proposed New Section 101 Reflects
(May
22,
2019),
Patent
Owner
Input,
IPWATCHDOG
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/22/draft-text-proposed-new-section-101reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498/ [https://perma.cc/KU5B-5VS4].
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II.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
MAYO AND ALICE
When modern courts deal with the judicial exceptions to
Section 101 of the Patent Act, they do so using what has come to
be known as the Mayo Alice two-step. Claims are first analyzed to
see if they are directed to one of the judicial exceptions. In the
second step, claims found to be directed to one of the judicial
exceptions are analyzed to see if enough has been added to the
claims to make them eligible. One of the most common criticisms
of the current 101 decisions is that they inappropriately incorporate
concerns more properly addressed in 102 and 103. 38 Often cited is
the fact that the Court has used the presence of manual noncomputer based analogues to label ideas abstract, 39 Congressional
removal of inventiveness as a specific patentability requirement, 40
and the Court’s focus on if claim elements are well-understood or
conventional. 41 However, as will be seen throughout this article,
those citing these concerns neglect or lack an understanding of
patent eligibility precedent.
A. Precedent for Incorporating Novelty and Obviousness into 101
Evaluations
1.

Patents Found Ineligible
Bilski and Mayo are two modern cases that are often criticized
for incorporating concerns more properly addressed in 102 and
38
See Ron Laurie, Alice in Blunderland: The Supreme Courts Conflation of
Abstractness and Obviousness, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/12/11/alice-in-blunderland-the-supremecourts-conflation-of-abstractness-and-obviousness/id=52563/
[https://perma.cc/GCC8-A7XZ]; Clarifying the Distinction Between the
“Inventive Concept” and “Patentability” requirements when determining
&
CAHOON
LLP,
Patent-Eligible
Subject
Matter,
CARSTENS
https://www.cclaw.com/2016/10/21/clarifying-distinction-inventive-conceptpatentability-requirements-determining-patent-eligible-subject-matter/
[https://perma.cc/P63E-JNEE] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); Paxton M. Lewis,
The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness: Alice’s Substitution of
Section 103, 2017 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 13 (2017).
39
See Laurie, supra note 38.
40
See Clarifying the Distinction, supra note 38.
41
See Lewis, supra note 38.
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103. An analysis of these cases and how they relate to Diamond v.
Diehr, Parker v. Flock, Gottschalk v. Benson, Funk Brothers,
Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co, Rubber-Tip Pencil Company v.
Howard, O’Reilly v. Morse, Le Roy v. Tatham illustrates the
precedent for such inclusion. The claim at issue in Bilski v. Kappos
included the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider
and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase
said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said
fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumers;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a
counter-risk position to said consumers;
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider
and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series
of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said
series of consumer transactions. 42

Claim 4 converted this process into a mathematical formula. 43
Later claims limited the process to certain industries 44 or suggested
using well-known methods to determine variables in the equation. 45
The Supreme Court found the claims unpatentable partially
because they were not “tied to a particular machine or apparatus” 46
and they did not “transform a particular article into a different state
or thing.” 47 Limiting use to energy markets was simply limiting an
abstract idea to one field of use or adding token post-solution
components. 48
In Mayo, 49 which established the modern understanding of the
Product and Law of Nature exception, 50 the Court found the claim
unpatentable partially because it only contained conventional and
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010).
Id. at 595.
44
Id. at 610.
45
Id. at 595.
46
Id. at 596.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 608. The Court cited Le Roy v. Tatham, Funk Brothers v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., Diamond v. Diehr, Parker v. Flook, and Gottschalk v. Benson in
reaching this decision.
49
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
50
Id.
42
43
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obvious activity when the law of nature was removed. 51 The Court
characterized the claim as stating a natural law that applied
conventional obvious methods. 52 As described in relation to Bilski,
worrying about parts of the claim being obvious or conventional
are 102 and 103 concerns.
Diamond v. Diehr 53 dealt with the patentability of an algorithm
embodied using a digital computer involved in curing synthetic
rubber. 54 Claim 1 of the patent read:
A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded
compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
providing said computer with a database for said press, including at
least,
natural logarithm conversion data (ln)
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said
compound being molded, and
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of
the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the
press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding,
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z)
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during
each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure,
which is
ln v = CZ + x
where v is the total required cure time,
repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during
the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated
with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates
equivalence. 55

Even based solely on claim length the specificity of the
Diehr claim when compared to the Bilski claim is obvious. The
Id. at 76.
Id.
53
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
54
Id. at 177.
55
Id. at 193 n.5.
51
52
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Court characterized the claim here as necessarily including (1)
continuously measuring the temperature inside a rubber curing
mold cavity, (2) using the continuously changing temperature to
calculate a continuously changing cure time using the Arrhenius
equation, and (3) signaling the computer to open the press when
the proper cure time is reached. 56 In contrast to Diehr, the
mathematical formula used was applied to a known structure or
process. 57 Importantly, all of this discussion was part of deciding if
the claim was eligible under 101.
Parker v. Flook dealt with what the Court determined was
simply an algorithm. 58 Claim 1 of the patent read:
A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at least
one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a
current value of
Bo + K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm
offset which comprises:
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present
value being defined as PVL;
(2) Determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation:
B1 = Bo(1.0-F) + PVL(F)
where F is a predetermine number greater than zero and less than 1.0;
(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as B1 + K;
and thereafter
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value. 59

Again, even a simple comparison of this claim with Diehr
highlights the differences in specificity. The Court characterized
this claim as requiring (1) measuring the present value of the
process variable, (2) using a specific algorithm to calculate an
updated alarm limit value, and (3) updating the actual alarm limit

Id. at 178.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010). Along with the cases cited
by Bilski, the Court cited Rubber Tip Pencil, O’Reilly v. Morse and Mackay
Radio & Telegraph in reaching their decision.
58
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
59
Id. at 596–97 (spacing in original).
56
57
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to the adjusted value. 60 In discussing 101 eligibility, the Court
separated out steps they considered to be conventional. 61 Only once
these steps were removed could the eligibility of what was left be
considered under 101. 62
One of the first cases dealing with the eligibility of computer
inventions, Gottschalk v. Benson, 63 dealt with converting binarycoded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers. 64 The Court
characterized the question as “whether the method described and
claimed is a process within the meaning of the Patent Act.” 65 As
detailed in the introduction, the patentability of processes is
established by Section 101 of the Patent Act. In denying the
patentability of the claim, the Court focused on (1) the general
nature of the invention as claimed, 66 and (2) the fact it could be
performed on “existing computers” 67 or even without a computer. 68
Funk Brothers dealt with a mixture of “selected mutually noninhibitive strains of different strains of bacteria of the genus
Rhizobium.” 69 Similarly to Flook, the Court separated out what
they characterized as obvious applications of the natural
principle. 70 The 101 question of import was not can the sale of
artificially mixed non-inhibitive species of Rhizobium be protected
by a patent, but is the fact that some strains of Rhizobium are
mutually non-inhibitive patentable. 71 Once it was known that
certain strains of Rhizobium were mutually non-inhibitive, mixing
Id. at 585.
Id. at 588, 590–94.
62
See id. at 594.
63
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
64
Id. at 66–67.
65
Id. at 64.
66
Id. at 65.
67
Id. at 67.
68
Id.
69
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 n.1 (1948).
70
Id. at 131.
71
Id. at 131–32. Rhizobium bacteria take nitrogen from the air and “fix” it in
soil in a form that can be absorbed by plants. Different strains work better for
different types of plants, but these strains generally kill each other. The
eponymous Funk brothers discovered strains of Rhizobium that did not kill each
other and attempted to patent a mixture as fertilizer.
60
61
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them was the product of skill—not invention.72 Mixing them and
selling them as fertilizer was obvious. 73
Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. 74 turned on claim
interpretation and enablement. However, while discussing
mathematical expressions of scientific truths are not patentable, the
Court stated “novel and useful structure[s] created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be [patentable].” 75 Novelty of
invention is not mentioned in Section 101 of the Patent Act – it is
only mentioned in Sections 102 and 103. 76
Precedent for incorporating novelty and obviousness into 101
evaluations can even be found in the everyday lead pencil. In
Rubber-Tip Pencil Company v. Howard, 77 the detachable eraser
was found to be patent ineligible. 78 According to the Court, once
the well-known erasive and elastic properties of rubber were
removed from the disclosure only an idea was left. Using
precedent and philosophy that will be discussed infra the Court
found the idea unpatentable. Considering if parts of the invention
are well-known is a 103 consideration.
The patent for arguably one of the most important inventions of
the 19th century, the telegraph, was constrained when the Court
incorporated 102 and 103 concepts into an eligibility discussion. In
O’Reilly v. Morse, 79 Morse claimed “the use of the motive power
of the electric or galvanic current . . . however developed, for
making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any
distances . . . .” 80 Citing the importance of allowing others to
practice novel, nonobvious improvements, the court limited

Id. at 132.
See id.
74
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86
(1939).
75
Id. at 94.
76
See supra Introduction.
77
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874).
78
Id. at 507.
79
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
80
Id. at 86.
72
73
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Morse’s rights to the specific method contained in his
specification. 81
As will be discussed infra Le Roy v. Tatham 82 established the
101 exceptions as well as their legal and philosophical basis.
Important here is that even in this foundational case considerations
of novelty and obviousness were an important part of the eligibility
discussion. Le Roy v. Tatham arguably established both the 101
exceptions as well as the legal and philosophical basis for them. 83
Considerations of novelty and obviousness were an important part
of the eligibility discussion. The district court instructed the jury
that even if the “combination of machinery in the abstract [was]
not new” 84 the invention was eligible since it applied a newly
discovered principle. 85 The Supreme Court overturned this
instruction. 86
2.

Patents Found Eligible
Along with looking at patents found ineligible, it is instructive
to look at patents the court found eligible. The fact that novelty and
non-obviousness of the claims were consistently crucial to the
claim’s eligibility illustrates how considerations of novelty and
non-obviousness have always been part of eligibility
considerations.
Tilghman v. Proctor 87 claimed “the manufacturing of fat acids
and glycerin from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high
temperature and pressure.” 88 Noting that methods of producing
glycerin from fatty bodies and water at 400 degrees existed at the
time of the patent, 89 the Court used the specification 90 to construe
Id. at 113–14.
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852).
83
See infra Sections II-B and II-C.
84
Id. at 159.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 174–75.
87
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
88
Id. at 709.
89
Id. at 734.
90
The specification is the figures and description included in a patent, it’s
basically everything other than the section starting with “I claim . . . .” which is
called the claims.
81
82
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the claim as “the process of subjecting to a high degree of heat a
mixture continually kept up, of nearly equal quantities of fat and
water in a convenient vessel strong enough to resist the effort of
the mixture to convert itself into steam.” 91 This novel and
nonobvious claim was eligible. 92
Similarly, the claim in New Process Fermentation Co. v.
Maus 93 read: “[t]he process of preparing and preserving beer for
the market, which consists in holding it under controllable pressure
of carbonic acid gas from the beginning of the kraeusen state until
such time as it is transferred to kegs and bunged, substantially as
described.” 94 Using the specification, the Court construed the claim
as:
[W]hen the beer has been put into the casks, and the kraeusen beer is
added to it, and the apparatus is applied at the beginning of the
kraeusen stage, the beer will be kept under a controllable pressure of
carbonic acid gas until such time as it is fit to be transferred to the kegs
for market, such pressure resulting in the complete and speedy
clarification of the beer, although it is in a state of active fermentation
in closed shavings casks, with the incidental results of no loss of beer,
no fouling of the casks or the cellar, no alteration of the flavor of the
beer, and no danger to the health of the workmen. 95

This novel and nonobvious invention 96 was patent eligible. 97
Expanded Metal Company v. Bradford 98 provides another
example where novelty and non-obviousness were critical to claim
eligibility under Section 101. The claim at issue in Expanded
Metal Company read:
The herein described method of making open or reticulated metal work,
which consists in simultaneously slitting and bending portions of a
plate or sheet of metal in such manner as to stretch or elongate the bars
connecting the slit portions and body of the sheet or plate, and then
similarly slitting and bending in places alternate to the first mentioned

Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 729.
See id. at 729–30.
93
New Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U.S. 413 (1887).
94
Id. at 423.
95
Id. at 428.
96
See id. at 424–27.
97
Id. at 428.
98
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
91
92
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portions, thus producing the finished expanded sheet metal of the same
length as that of the original sheet, substantially as described. 99

“The[] record[] [in Expanded Metal Company left] no doubt
that there are substantial advantages in the method of the patent in
suit.” 100 This novel and nonobvious claim was eligible under
101. 101
It is true that Section 102 and Section 103 did not exist when
some of these earlier cases were decided. 102 This has not, however,
made a difference to the Court. Exactly how obviousness and
novelty should be considered in eligibility decisions has been
debated by the Court. Three judges believed that limiting the
patent in Flook to catalytic conversion made it patentable. 103 Four
judges believed that under Flook the disclosure in Diamond. v.
Diehr was ineligible. 104 As the above discussion shows however,
all the judges believed that novelty and obviousness should be
considered in eligibility decisions. 105
B. Legal Precedent for the 101 Exceptions
Ever since Thomas Jefferson referred to “the public
embarrassment of an exclusive patent,” 106 patentability has had a
rocky history in the United States. But even though precedent
exists for incorporating 102 and 103 considerations into 101
decisions, surely those who say no precedent exists for the 101

Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
101
Id. at 385–86.
102
See Patents, 35 U.S.C. (1952); Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109; Patent Act
of 1836, 5 Stat. 117. Earlier Patent Acts had portions similar to Section 101 and
102, but they were part of a general patentability section. Obviousness was not
introduced until 1952 when Section 101, 102, and 103 were added.
103
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
104
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204–18 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105
But see id. at 188–91 n.12 (discussing the impropriety of importing section
102 and 103 considerations into 101). But as shown by above discussion of
cases since 1975 this discussion has been ignored by the court and is at odds
with earlier precedent.
106
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 13:333–335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb
& Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1905).
99

100
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exceptions 107 are correct. Section 101 of the Patent Act lists no
exceptions and simply states that articles of manufacture,
machines, processes, compositions of matter, or improvements of
the above are patentable. 108 As with the incorporation of 102 and
103 into 101, a careful and thoughtful reading of the historical
cases elucidates the legal and philosophical underpinnings and why
those who say they do not exist are incorrect.
1.

Abstract Ideas
The modern articulation of the “abstract idea” exception was
made in Alice Corp v. CLS Bank. 109 Claim 33, which reads as
shown below, was used as a representative claim:
A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party
holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution,
the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined
obligations, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution
from the exchange institutions;
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for
each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit
record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do
not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the
value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment
taking place in chronological order, and at the end of the day the
supervisory institution instructing on[e] of the exchange institutions to
exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the
respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said
See Gene Quin, Sherry Knowles Scrutinizes an Activist Supreme Court and
its Unconstitutional Approach to Patent Eligibility, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 19,
2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/16/sherry-knowles-scrutinizesactivist-supreme-court-unconstitutional-patent-eligibility/id=105228/
[https://perma.cc/5NFS-MSTC]; Gene Quin, Does the Supreme Court Even
Appreciate the Patent Eligibility Chaos They Created?, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 12,
2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/12/103256/id=103256/
[https://perma.cc/JJ89-6PBU].
108
See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148
(1989).
109
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
107
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permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable time
invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions. 110

The Court characterized this as an intermediary creating and
updating account ledgers as real-world accounts changed, and only
allowing transactions that kept the accounts in the black. 111 The
Court determined the claims were directed to the well-known idea
of intermediated settlement, 112 and amounted to generic computer
implementation of an abstract idea, 113 and were thus invalid. 114
In deciding if claims directed to a judicial exception 115 have
enough extra material, the obviousness and novelty of this extra
material is analyzed. 116 As was discussed previously, incorporating
such 102 and 103 considerations into 101 analysis has a long
precedent. 117
Claim 1 in Bilski, which was cited by Alice, 118 was cited supra
and will not be repeated here. Claim 4 converted this process into a
mathematical formula. 119 Later claims limited the process to certain
industries 120 or suggested using well-known methods to determine
variables in the equation. 121 The Court found this an ineligible
attempt to patent the application of the abstract idea of risk
hedging in energy markets. 122 The Court struck down the patent. 123

Id. at 209 n.2.
Id. at 210, 216.
112
Id. at 215–18 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852); Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
113
Id. at 216, 220–23.
114
Id. at 220–23.
115
Abstract Idea, Phenomena of Nature, and Natural Product are commonly
referred to as the judicial exceptions. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
116
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 76
(2012).
117
See supra Section II-A.
118
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 210 (2014).
119
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 606.
110
111
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Since the Court found the claims in Diamond v. Diehr
eligible, 124 it provides an important contrast. Claim 1 of the Diehr
patent was cited in the previous section. As a reminder, the court
characterized the steps of the invention as: (1) continuously
measuring the temperature inside the mold cavity, (2) using the
continuously changing temperature to calculate a continuously
changing cure time using the Arrhenius equation, and (3) signaling
the computer to open the press when the proper cure time is
reached. 125 The Court characterized this not as an attempt to patent
the Arrhenius equation or even an abstract application of the
Arrhenius equation, but an application of the law of nature to a
concrete physical process. 126 The Court also made much of the
arguably minor lexicological fact that the claim in question was a
process rather than a method claim as in Flook. 127 As discussed
previously, 128 four Supreme Court justices, citing Flook, would
have invalidated the claims. 129
Flook, Gottschalk, and Rubber Tip Pencil were discussed in
detail in the last section. In each of these cases, the invention was
found ineligible as an abstract idea or as the court described it in
Rubber Tip Pencil as early as the late 19th century an unpatentable
“idea of itself.” 130
Corning v. Burden 131 is somewhat problematic but important.
Corning held that patents were grantable for “the means or method
of producing a certain result” 132 but not “the result or effect
produced.” 133 This was a significant alteration of the language used
in previous cases, and was not used in subsequent cases. Taken
Id. at 609 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)).
124
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
125
Id. at 178.
126
Id. at 187–88.
127
Id. at 188 n.10.
128
See supra notes 102-05.
129
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130
Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
131
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853).
132
Id. at 268.
133
Id.
123
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literally this language would seem to prohibit the patenting of new
states of matter. New states of matter, such as pharmaceutical
drugs, would certainly seem to be results or produced effects of
means or methods. This may be why the language was dropped.
How later cases deal with Corning and with Cochrane, 134 which
defined a patentable process as acts transforming an item to a
“different state or thing” 135 is important context for the
philosophical basis for the 101 exceptions.
The Supreme Court overturned the instruction, stating that a
newly discovered principle applied using non-new machinery and
methods was patentable in Le Roy. 136 The Court also stated:
It is admitted that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these can
not be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be
discovered in addition to those already known. Through the agency of
machinery, a new steam power may be said to have been generated.
But no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself under the
patent laws. The same may be said of electricity and any other power in
nature which is alike open to all and may be applied to useful purposes
by the use of machinery. 137

As early as 1852 in Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court established
that abstract ideas were ineligible for patenting, an idea that was
later referenced and reinforced in Alice which is seen as the
modern interpretation of this exception. Just because the lower
courts, USTPO, and the Patent Bar ignored over 150 years of
precedent, does not mean the Supreme Court will do so. At most
the Supreme Court could overrule this precedent, but the precedent
must be acknowledged and a well-reasoned and researched
argument presented for overturning it. So far no one has presented
such an argument to the Supreme Court.

Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
Id. at 788.
136
See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1852).
137
Id.
134
135
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2.

Products, Laws of Nature
Similarly, as to how Alice established the modern
understanding of the abstract idea exception, 138 the modern
understanding of the “product of nature” or “law of nature”
exception was established by Mayo. 139 The contested claim in
Mayo read:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having
said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108
red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per
8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said
drug subsequently administered to said subject. 140

At the time the patent was filed it was known that measurement
of 6MP metabolites, such as 6-thioguanine, could be used to
predict the clinical efficacy and tolerance to thiopurine drugs. 141
The specific ranges claimed, however, were novel. Under the first
step in the Mayo two step analysis, because the detected ranges
were determined by the metabolism of thiopurine drugs by the
patient’s body, the Court characterized the claims as relating to a
natural process/law. 142 Following the next step in the Mayo two
step analysis, 143 the Court characterized the rest of the claim as
obvious and conventional, and so invalidated the patent. 144
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
140
Id. at 74–75.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 77.
143
See id.
144
Id. at 70–71, 94 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981);
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O’Reilly v.
Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-120 (1854); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86
138
139

MAR. 2020]

Why Removing 101 Won't Be Enough

161

Isolated genes and other natural products were found ineligible
for patenting in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics. 145 Myriad Genetics discovered the location and sequence
of two genes, BRACA1 and BRACA2, that, when mutated,
drastically increase the risk of breast and ovarian cancer. 146 Myriad
Genetics claimed isolated DNA coding for various BRACA 1 and
2 sequences. 147 Simply separating the gene from its surrounding
genetic material was an act of discovery, not invention, and thus
not patentable. 148 Chakrabarty was differentiated because Myriad
Genetics did not add any genetic information to a living
organism. 149
Diamond, Bilski, O’Reilly, Gottschalk, and Mackay Radio have
been discussed previously 150 and will not be discussed further. It is
important to note, however, that their citations in this case
illustrates how the Court sees the Section 101 exceptions as a
wholistic entity. This is key to the philosophical basis of the
Section 101 exceptions and potential legislative strategies. 151
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 152 held that living things were patent
eligible, 153 but continued to acknowledge the Section 101
exceptions. 154 A bacterium altered by the hand of man such that it
broke down crude oil was eligible. 155 The law of relativity, 156 the
law of gravity, 157 a newly discovered mineral, 158 and a wild plant, 159
however, were not patent eligible.
(1939); and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)).
145
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569
U.S. 576, 596 (2013).
146
Id. at 582–83.
147
Id. at 584.
148
Id. at 592 n.4.
149
Id. at 590–91.
150
See supra Section II.
151
See infra Section III.
152
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
153
See id. at 310.
154
Id. at 305, 310.
155
Id. at 303, 310.
156
See id. at 309.
157
See id.
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As discussed previously, the court separated out the obvious
application from the natural principle in Funk Brothers. 160 The fact
that some strains of Rhizobium did not kill each other was a law of
nature. 161 No human had created the non-inhibitive strains of
Rhizobium—nature had. 162 As such, there was no invention. 163
The Telephone Cases 164 provide an early example showing the
ineligibility of natural laws but the eligibility of applications of
them. 165 The Court characterized Bell as claiming the manipulation
of electricity in specific ways to carry sound 166 and not on the use
of electricity itself. 167 The former was patent eligible. 168 The latter
was not. 169
Contrarily, the Court found the claims in Morse an attempt to
patent a natural principle. 170 The Court went to great lengths in
Tilghman, 171 where the court found a biological process patentable,
as discussed previously, 172 to differentiate Morse from The
Telephone Cases. Processes that applied natural laws were
patentable while natural laws themselves were not. 173
The Court’s reasoning seems to point to some sort of
physicality requirement. The Court analogized Morse to Neilson v.
Harford. 174 The Court in Tilghman characterized the unpatentable
principle in Neilson through its statement, “a hot-blast is better
158

See id.
See id.
160
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131, 132
(1948).
161
Id. at 130.
162
See id. at 132.
163
See id.
164
Dolbear v. American Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888) [hereinafter “The
Telephone Cases”].
165
See generally id.
166
Id. at 534.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 535.
169
Id. at 534.
170
See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113–17 (1853).
171
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
172
See id. at 733–34.
173
See id. at 722–23.
174
Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
159
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than a cold blast for smelting iron.” 175 What Neilson patented,
however, according to the Tilghman Court, was the interposition of
“a receptacle for heated air between the blowing apparatus and the
furnace.” 176 The Tilghman Court construed the claims in Tilghman
and Neilson as claiming an application of the natural power rather
than the power itself. 177 Tilghman and Neilson, however, have
significant structure in their allowed claims. 178 Tilghman included a
vessel strong enough to resist explosion while Neilson included a
receptacle. 179
This structural requirement may help explain the Court’s hair
splitting between Flook and Diehr. Diehr required a rubbermolding press, a database unique to each press and an apparatus
capable of constantly determining the temperature of the mold
cavity. 180 Flook, on the other hand, had no comparable apparatus
limitations. Regardless, the key point here is that the Court
discussed natural law patent ineligibility all the way back in the
mid 1800’s. 181
As with Alice, Le Roy was cited by Mayo which established the
modern understanding of the product of nature/natural law
exception. Since the relevance of Le Roy as legal precedent for the
abstract idea exception has already been discussed, the case will
not be discussed here except to point out that it applies equally to
the product of nature/natural law exception. The discussions of
new powers can easily apply to natural products/natural laws,
especially since the example the Court uses is steam. Like with the
abstract idea exception, just because the lower courts, USPTO, and
the Patent Bar miss the implications of precedent, does not mean
the Supreme Court will.

Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 724.
Id.
177
Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 726; see also Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1266.
178
See Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 727; see also Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1266.
179
See Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 714; see also Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1266.
180
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981).
181
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978))
175
176
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C. The Philosophical Underpinnings of the 101 Exceptions
As was noted in the previous section, the Supreme Court cites
cases dealing with the abstract idea exception when finding
something as ineligible as a Natural Law or Natural Product. This
is because, as will be seen, the philosophical underpinning for all
of the exceptions, according to the Court, is the same. So, this
section, unlike the previous, will not be further subdivided.
According to the Court, the 101 exceptions are necessary to
prevent the patenting of basic tools of scientific and technological
work. 182 This is necessary because patenting these basic tools
would “inhibit future innovation premised upon them.” 183
Inhibiting innovation in this way would be against both the policy
of the patent law and the “very point of patents.” 184 The importance
or excellence of the invention was irrelevant since “brilliant
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” 185 The Court
made this blatantly clear in Alice, 186 Myraid, 187 and Mayo. 188 In
Mayo, the Court went so far as to characterize patent law as a
“two-edged sword” 189 capable of both spurring and obstructing
information flows. 190 Bilski echoed this same concern when it
stated that courts must balance the “tension, ever present in patent
law, between stimulating innovation by protecting inventors and
impeding progress by granting patents when not justified by the
statutory design.” 191 Doing anything less would “put a chill on
creative endeavor and dynamic change.” 192
This concern is not limited to the more modern 101 cases of the
21st century, however. Flook also turned on ensuring the use of
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 587
(2013).
183
Id. at 589.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 591.
186
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014).
187
Myriad, 576 U.S. at 596.
188
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 89
(2012).
189
Id. at 92.
190
Id.
191
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605–06 (2010).
192
Id. at 608.
182
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basic scientific building blocks was not preempted. Even though
the claim was limited to the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons, this was not enough of a limit for the Court. 193 This
is clearly articulated by the dissent’s argument that limiting the
claims to conversion of hydrocarbons prevented preemption. 194
Furthermore, the animating concern in Gottschalk v. Benson was
how preventing the preemption of basic scientific building blocks
is proven by a differentiation from Corning. In reference to
Corning, the Court in Gottschalk remarked that “[t]he chemical
process or the physical acts which transform the raw material are
[in Corning], however, sufficiently definite to confine the patent
monopoly within rather definite bounds.” 195 Thus, the claims in
Corning could be allowed, but since Gottschalk lacked such
definite chemical processes or physical acts, its claims could not.
This same concern can be traced back to the 19th century.
Gottschalk noted how Bell did not claim “all telephonic use of
electricity.” 196 In the Telephone Cases, the Court noted this
themselves when they stated that Bell’s claims were not for “the
use of a current of electricity in its natural state,” 197 but rather a
continuous circuit of electricity in a closed circuit “into a certain
specified condition[] suited to the transmission of vocal and other
sounds.” 198 Even in the two earliest cases that arguably established
the judicial exceptions—Morse and Le Roy 199—extensive
preemption of later discoveries and interference with patent law
policy was the issue. Morse’s claims were invalid since they would
prevent inventors of improvements from practicing those
improvements. 200 Le Roy’s claims were invalid since a contrary
holding “by creating monopolies, would discourage arts and
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978).
Id. at 599–600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
195
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972) (referencing Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1853)).
196
Id.
197
Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 534, 535 (1888).
198
Id. at 534.
199
See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 62 (1853); Le Roy v. Tetham, 55 U.S.
156, 156 (1852).
200
See Morse, 56 U.S. at 113–14.
193
194
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manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws.” 201 The
101 exceptions exist because the Court believes, and has since the
late 1800s, that they are necessary to prevent patent law from
inhibiting as opposed to promoting scientific advancement.
III.
WHY THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FIX IS DOOMED
As the previous discussion shows, the Section 101 exceptions
have been around at least since 1852. 202 What may not be as
obvious, but becomes clear with a little discernment, is that the
Supreme Court did not invent the exceptions without “support
anywhere in the law . . . out of whole cloth.” 203 As explained
above, the Court consistently based the Section 101 exceptions on
ensuring patent law encouraged, rather than discouraged,
innovation. The constitutional connection has not been stated
directly. The Court has never held The Patent Act unconstitutional.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to write patent laws.
Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution reads in part: “The Congress
shall have the Power to . . . promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 204
The connection should now be obvious to even the most
casual, intellectually honest observer. The Court believes the
Constitution limits Congress’s power to implement patent law.
Patent law can only be enacted when it promotes the progress of
science and the useful arts, and the Section 101 exceptions are
necessary to ensure current patent law meets this requirement. The
Court did not quote this clause when referring to eligibility
concerns until relatively modern times, 205 but the Court stated in Le
Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175.
See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text (exceptions may have been
around even earlier in the decisions of lower courts).
203
Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Lawless Decision by an Omnipotent
Court Wreaking Havoc on Patents, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23/mayo-v-prometheus-lawless-decisionwreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/ [https://perma.cc/Q6MN-H7MS].
204
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
205
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181 (1981).
201
202
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Roy that allowing the disputed claims “would discourage arts and
manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws.” 206 The
Court invalidated Morse’s patent largely because the Court
believed allowing it would inhibit development of
improvements. 207 Tilghman reiterated the importance of this
holding by quoting it extensively. 208 Specifically, the Court noted
positively that Tilghman did not “claim every mode” 209 of
separating fatty acids and glycerin using water. 210 Expanded Metal
Co. acknowledged the importance of considering the patent laws’
“object and purpose.” 211
The modern cases make the connection between the
Constitution and the Section 101 exceptions even more explicit.
Chakrabarty began its decision by directly stating:
The Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate to “Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” The patent laws promote this progress by
offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive
for their inventiveness and research efforts. 212

Bilski states that the Section 101 exceptions “serve a critical
role in adjusting the tension, ever present in patent law, between
stimulating innovation . . . and impeding progress.” 213 The Section
101 exceptions keep patent law from “put[ing] a chill on creative
endeavor[s] and dynamic change[s].” 214 This thread continued in
Mayo where the Court characterized patent law as a “two-edged
sword” 215 that had to be prevented from “inhibit[ing] further
discovery.” 216 In Myriad, the Court stated that the Section 101
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (emphasis added).
See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113–14 (1853).
208
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 727 (1880).
209
Id. at 729.
210
Id.
211
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 382 (1909).
212
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
213
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010).
214
Id. at 608.
215
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92
(2012).
216
Id. at 85.
206
207
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exceptions were necessary because they prevented the “inhibit[ion]
[of] future innovation” 217 by averting the “tie[ing] up” 218 of “basic
tools of scientific and technological work.” 219 In Alice, the Court
grounded the Section 101 exceptions most strongly in the
Constitution when it stated:
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle
as one of pre-emption . . . Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are “the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”
“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might
tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,”
thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. (Congress
“shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”). We have “repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent
law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use
of” these building blocks of human ingenuity. 220

Even in cases that do not touch directly on the Section 101
exceptions, the Court has emphasized the importance of ensuring
the patent laws don’t inhibit innovation. American patent law rests
on “the need to promote innovation,” 221 due to the cost in time and
money of research and development. 222 However, the patent clause
“is both a grant of power and a limitation.” 223 Congress “may not
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose,” 224 nor may the patent monopoly be enlarged “without
regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained
thereby,” 225 and the “standard expressed in the Constitution . . .
may not be ignored.” 226 It could be argued, of course, that the
217
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013) (quoting Mayo, 556 U.S. at 86).
218
Id.
219
Id. (quoting Mayo, 556 U.S. at 71).
220
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Mayo, 556 U.S. at 71–85; Myriad, 569 U.S. at
589).
221
Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
222
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974); see also
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989).
223
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
224
Id. at 5–6.
225
Id. at 6.
226
Id. (emphasis in original).

MAR. 2020]

Why Removing 101 Won't Be Enough

169

statements in Kewanee Oil, Bonito Boats, and John Deere are
dictum. 227 However, the Courts exhortation not to read conditions
and limitations into patent law that lacks legislative support, which
has been used to support expansive patent rights, was taken from a
case dealing with shop rights and assignment. 228 In a world where
the Supreme Court can make dictum non-dictum at any time,
treating Supreme Court cases as if they contain no dictum seems
the safer course. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has a habit of
quietly overturning itself. In Expanded Metal Co., the Court held
that “a process or method involving mechanical operations, and
producing a new and useful result” is patentable, 229 while Risdon
Iron held that the only patentable processes were chemical in
nature or used a natural force such as electricity. 230 In Expanded
Metal Co., the Court stated it would not question the decision in
None of these three cases dealt with eligibility under § 101. Bonito Boats
concerned the ability of states to offer protection to utilitarian and design ideas
outside of the federal scheme. See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 143 (1989). Kewanee Oil dealt with federal preemption of state
trade secret law. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480. John Deere arguably dealt
with the requirement of obviousness. for patentability. See John Deere, 383 U.S.
at 3, 14–15, 17–19. But see id. at 3–4, 16–17 (“After a lapse of 15 years, the
Court again focuses its attention on the patentability of inventions under the
standard of Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution . . . We have concluded that the
1952 Act was intended to codify judicial precedents embracing the principle
long ago announced by this Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, [], and that, while
the clear language of § 103 places emphasis on an inquiry into obviousness, the
general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains the same
. . . [i]t is contended, however, by some of the parties and by several of the amici
that the first sentence of § 103 was intended to sweep away judicial precedents
and to lower the level of patentability . . . We believe that this legislative history,
as well as other sources, shows that the revision was not intended by Congress
to change the general level of patentable invention.”). These quotes tend to
imply that something more than obviousness under Section 103 is being
discussed here.
228
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); United States v.
Dubliner Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 182 (1933) (“The prayers are for a
declaration that the respondent is a trustee for the government, and, as such,
required to assign to the United States all its right, title, and interest in the
patents.”).
229
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 385–86 (1909).
230
See Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 77 (1895).
227
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Risdon 231 and the syllabus simply stated that Risdon was
“distinguished.” 232 This is common Supreme Court practice. 233
Let me be blunt. For reasons I will lay out in detail below, I
abjectly disagree with the Supreme Court reasoning cited in many
of these cases. Patenting natural products, natural processes, and
abstract ideas does not inhibit the progress of science. Removing
the economic incentive, as the Supreme Court has for research
around natural products, natural processes, and abstract ideas does
inhibit science. It can also certainly be argued that the Constitution
does not inhibit Congress’s power the way the Supreme Court
thinks it does. Further, it is in my economic interest to convince
people that the Supreme Court invented the exceptions without
“support anywhere in the law,” creating them “out of whole cloth
without any authority.” 234
However, this does not mean I can ignore the obvious Section
101 exception precedent, the clear philosophical basis for that
precedent, or what that means for the proposed changes to Section
101. Doing so would be (1) intellectually dishonest, (2) require me
to ignore what I know about the Supreme Court’s treatment of
precedent, or (3) require me to ignore what I know to be true
because it suits my economic interests. Legal and personal ethics,
along with my inner sense of morality makes this impossible. 235
Where does this leave the proposed Section 101 changes? As
the above discussion proves, the Supreme Court did not invent the
101 exceptions without support. The exceptions go back at least
Expanded Metal, 214 U.S. at 382.
Id. at 366.
233
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (arguably overturning
precedent dating back 100 years when the court decided Gibbons v. Ogden in
1824).
234
Quinn, supra note 201.
235
But see id.; Gene Quinn, Does the Supreme Court Even Appreciate the
Patent Eligibility Chaos They Created?, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/12/103256/id=103256/
[https://perma.cc/NG6W-8VMF]; Gene Quinn, Sherry Knowles Scrutinizes an
Activist Supreme Court and its Unconstitutional Approach to Patent Eligibility,
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/16/sherryknowles-scrutinizes-activist-supreme-court-unconstitutional-patenteligibility/id=105228/ [https://perma.cc/8HTF-6QQ7].
231
232
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one-hundred and sixty-seven years, and are based in Le Roy, which
based their existence on patent law’s public policy foundations as
expressed in the Constitution’s Patent Clause. The exceptions
constitutional foundation was recognized in both Le Roy’s
historical and modern progeny as well as in unrelated historical
and modern cases. The proposed changes directly abolish the
exceptions. 236 If the language is passed “as is,” the Court is likely
to find the amended clause unconstitutional. Citing Le Roy, Morse,
Tilghman, Expanded Metal, Flook, Chakrabarty, Bilski, Mayo, and
Alice, the Court would likely overtly ground the exceptions in the
Constitution. If the Court felt the need for additional support, it
would likely cite Bonito Boats, Kewanee Oil, and Graham v. John
Deere. Certainly, counter-arguments exist, some of which will be
discussed in the section below, but the best way forward is not by
disregarding clear legal precedent, but rather by remembering that
Article I, Section 8, clause 8 is not the only part of the Constitution
that intellectual property law is based on.
A. How to Overcome the 101 Exceptions
Perhaps the most obvious argument against finding the
proposed changes to Section 101 unconstitutional, is that they will
not decrease the advancement of science and the useful arts.
Evidence the proposed changes will not decrease advancements
certainly exists, especially in the biotechnology space. 237 However,
counter-evidence also exists. For example, the effects of the
exceptions on software and internet technologies is not as
pronounced as in the biotechnology space. 238 Moreover,
presidential commissions have argued against the patenting of
computer programs, 239 and much economic research questions the
success or necessity of patent based incentives. 240 Certainly further
236

See supra.
See Introduction; see also supra text accompanying notes 5, 23, 26–28.
238
See Introduction; see also supra and text accompanying note 29.
239
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
240
See, e.g RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54 (Little Brown,
2nd ed. 1977); ABBOT P. USHER, A HISTORY OF MECHANICAL INVENTIONS 1–
31, (McGraw Hill, 1st ed. 1929); Frederic M. Scherer, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 384–87 (Rand McNally, 1970);
Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure and Innovation:
237
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counter-evidence supporting the necessity of patent incentives also
exists. 241 The difference in incentives’ necessity in the computer
and biotech space is especially noteworthy given the above
discussion of the Supreme Court’s application of reasoning from
“natural product” and “natural process” cases to the “abstract
ideas” cases. 242 The Court is unlikely to apply the exceptions
differently based on technological sector.
If the Court uses the Constitution to invalidate the new law,
why not consider revising the Constitution? The Constitution was
last successfully amended in 1992 by an amendment originally
proposed in 1789. 243 Amending the Constitution requires that an
amendment first be proposed by “two thirds of both Houses,” 244 or
during a constitutional convention called by “the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States.” 245 Ratification of a proposed
amendment requires ratification by the legislatures of three fourths
of the several States 246 or ratification by constitutional conventions
in three fourths of the several States. 247 Achieving this level of
unanimity is difficult even in the best of times. This is why the
Constitution has only been amended 27 times in its one-hundredand-thirty-one-year history.
Chakrabarty Rohm and Haas 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 458–60 (1982);
Eisenberg, supra note 220; Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the
American Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 479–81 (1940); Michael
Polanyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 61, 65 (1944).
241
See, e.g., supra section 1; WARD S. BOWMAN JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST
LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 2–3 (Chicago 1973); KENNETH J.
ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR
INVENTION 619 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.); William F. Baxter, Legal
Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76
YALE L. J. 267, 268–69 (1966); Eisenberg, supra note 220, at 1017, 1024–27;
Edwin Mansfield et al. Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial
Innovations, 91 QJ ECON. 221, 233–34 (1977).
242
See supra Section II.
243
Steven G. Calabresi & Zephyr Teachout, The Twenty-Seventh Amendment,
NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/
interpretation/amendment-xxvii/interps/165 [https://perma.cc/3575-PP79].
244
U.S CONST. art. 5.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
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As an example of the above, in 2010, the Supreme Court
decided that limiting the amount of money corporations could
donate to political causes violated the First Amendment. 248 The
decision became controversial almost instantly. A 2018 University
of Maryland study 249 found that three fourths of respondents
overall, 66 percent of Republicans and 85 percent of Democrats,
wanted to overturn Citizens United with a constitutional
amendment. 250 An admittedly smaller Bloomberg poll 251 in 2015,
found that 78 percent of respondents wanted the ruling
overturned. 252 Multiple groups such as Public Citizen, 253 Common
Cause, 254 and The Stamp Stampede 255 are mobilizing to propose a
constitutional amendment. Multiple celebrities and well-known

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Steven Kull et al., Americans Evaluate Campaign Finance Reform
FOR
PUB.
CONSULTATION
(May
2018),
Program,
PROGRAM
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4455238campaignfinancereport.html [https://perma.cc/PMX7-NS3Y].
250
Id.; Ashley Balcerzak, Study: Most Americans want to kill ‘Citizens
United’ with constitutional amendment, PUB. RADIO INT’L (May 10, 2018),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-10/study-most-americans-want-killcitizens-united-constitutional-amendment [https://perma.cc/GS5Y-F7J2].
251
See Cristian Farias, Americans Agree on One Thing: Citizens United is
Terrible, HUFFPOST (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/citizensunited-john-roberts_n_560acd0ce4b0af3706de129d
[https://perma.cc/6VTWE56C]. The noted Bloomberg poll had only 1001 participants.
252
Id.; see also Greg Stohr, Bloomberg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court
to Turn Off Political Spending Spigot, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-28/bloomberg-pollamericans-want-supreme-court-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot
[https://perma.cc/97B5-2YLT].
253
PUBLIC CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/ [https://perma.cc/LZH2-Q3M3]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
254
Amend the Constitution to Overturn Citizens United, COMMON CAUSE,
https://actionnetwork.org/petitions/amend-the-constitution-to-overturn-citizensunited?source=takeactionpanel&_ga=2.233513502.1865421674.15621846071253684198.1562184607 [https://perma.cc/7SH6-NS68] (last visited Mar. 11,
2020).
255
Overturn
Citizens
United,
THE
STAMP
STAMPEDE,
https://www.stampstampede.org/money-out-voters-in/overturn-citizens-united/
[https://perma.cc/KY4A-KQ3X] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
248
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politicians such as George Clooney, 256 Rosario Dawson, 257 and
Bernie Sanders 258 have all come out in support of a constitutional
amendment overturning Citizens United. So, the movement is not
lacking in star power. Still though, while constitutional
amendments have been proposed in Congress, 259 none have passed
either house. If a Supreme Court decision that arguably 78 percent
of the population disagrees with cannot be overturned by
constitutional amendment, overturning a group of decisions
supported by over 150 years of precedent 260 and powerful nongovernmental interests is likely an impossibility.
In a related proposal, an attempt could be made to convince the
Court that the first clause of Article 1 Section 8 Clause 8 does not
limit the second clause. This would be like the winning argument
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 261 where the first clause of the
Second Amendment was held to be a non-limiting prefatory
clause. 262 Since such a decision would go against over 150 years of
precedent, 263 this argument too is unlikely to succeed.
All is not lost, however, as the Patent Clause is not the only
constitutional power under which the government can grant
monopolies. In the Trademark Cases, 264 the Court found the
Reena Flores, George Clooney talks “obscene” money in politics, CBS
NEWS (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-clooneypolitical-fundraisers-cost-an-obscene-amount-of-money/
[https://perma.cc/7YWG-74QX].
257
Danielle Odiamar, Rosario Dawson Arrested While Protesting in a Bernie
CLAIRE
(Apr.
18,
2016),
Sanders
Jacket,
MARIE
https://www.marieclaire.com/celebrity/a19960/rosario-dawson-arrested-berniesanders/ [https://perma.cc/2DKV-WSWL].
258
Bernie Sanders, Get Big Money Out of Politics and Restore Democracy,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/get-big-money-out-of-politics-and-restoredemocracy/ [https://perma.cc/66A3-R3X9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
259
See e.g., Rachel Frazin, Schiff introduces constitutional amendment to
HILL
(May
8,
2019),
overturn
Citizens
United,
THE
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/442697-schiff-introduces-constitutionalamendment-to-overturn-citizens-united [https://perma.cc/H93Z-D4WQ].
260
See supra.
261
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
262
Id.
263
See supra Section II.
264
In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
256
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government had the power “to establish the conditions on which
these rights shall be enjoyed and exercised, the period of their
duration, and the legal remedies for their enforcement” 265 under the
Commerce Clause if the act was limited to “commerce with
foreign nations, commerce among the States, and commerce with
the Indian tribes.” 266 Trademark law is currently so limited. 267
There is no reason that a patent law specifically making products
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, patentable could
not be similarly upheld under the Commerce Clause.
It could be argued that the Trademark Cases allow enactment
of a law simply not enabled, rather than nullified by the Patent
Clause. 268 The Court did state “we are unable to see [in the Patent
Clause] any such power.” 269 This does seem to imply that the
Patent Clause neither allows nor prevents the enactment of
trademark legislation. As explained above, the Court is likely to
hold that the Patent Clause prevents enactment of patent laws
negating the judicial exceptions. 270 However, in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,271 the government
stated that the Commerce Clause prevented the government from
compelling commerce and thus imposing a penalty on those who
didn’t buy health insurance. 272 The individual mandate was “not
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” 273 It was an
“act[] of usurpation” 274 and “deserve[d] to be treated as such.” 275
The individual mandate was, however, constitutional under
Congress’s power to tax. 276
This legal reasoning shows a practical yet honest way forward.
Congress should acknowledge, without agreeing with, the Court’s
Id. at 93.
Id. at 96.
267
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
268
See Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
269
Id.
270
See supra Section II.
271
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 522–24 (2012).
272
See id.
273
Id. at 654 (internal quotations omitted).
274
Id. at 559 (internal quotations omitted).
275
Id.
276
Id. at 562.
265
266
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position that the Patent Clause prevents the patenting of natural
products, natural processes, and abstract ideas. Congress should
then make a law overturning these exceptions and blatantly rely on
the Commerce Clause to do so. Sebelius can be used to defeat the
argument that one enumerated power cannot allow what another
enumerated power prohibits. In a world where an act of Congress
can be prevented by one clause of the Constitution in the strongest
possible terms but allowed by another, a law only arguably
prevented by the Patent Clause could be allowed by the Commerce
Clause.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Alice and Mayo are based on precedent going back at least 150
years. Consistently from Le Roy to Mayo and Alice, the Court
based the Section 101 exceptions on the need to prevent patent law
from inhibiting innovation. A direct line can be drawn from this
reasoning to U.S. Constitution article 1, section 8, clause 8. This
clause has historically been used as the basis for Congress enacting
patent law. The current legislative changes to Section 101 are a
blatant attempt to overturn the decisions establishing the judicial
exceptions to Section 101. Given that the Court bases these
exceptions on U.S. Constitution article 1, section 8, clause 8 the
Court is likely to find the amended Section 101 unconstitutional.
To avoid this, Congress should explicitly base the amendments,
and thus all of patent law, on the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.
The argument that one part of the constitution cannot allow what
another part forbids can be negated using Sebelius.

